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## THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FIGURES OF SPEECH

By JUNE E. DOWNEY

One of the greatest charms of style is its employment of figurative language, its use of apt comparisons. The delight in parable and allegory, in fable and metaphor, characterizes the modern as well as the primitive mind. From the psychological side we have the substitution of one image or meaning or situation for another. Sometimes an implicit substitution runs through a story and we have an allegory as in "Pilgrim's Progress;" sometimes a deliberate comparison is initiated as by Matthew Arnold in "Sohrab and Rustum" when, for example, the young prince is likened to a cypress that grew in the queen's garden, tall and dark and straight. Sometimes the substitution is a swift and unexpected identification of two objects of thought as in a descriptive bit of an automobile ride at midnight which runs: "The car purred with the contentment of a great house-cat and lapped up the shimmering road like a stream of milk."

Rhetoricians have long rejoiced in minute study and classification of figures of speech,—a process that seems productive of little else than weariness of flesh and vexation of spirit. Recently it has been realized that from the psychological point of view a study of such figures is most promising. Here lies a rich field waiting cultivation. In the comparison we find ideas in the making, we snap-shot mind engaged in its curious labor of substitution and identification, in its effort at emotional articulation and emphasis.<sup>1</sup>

There are two ways in which one may approach a study of figures of speech. One may investigate the general motivation of the process or one may enter into detailed analysis of the various mental processes involved and determine the variety and extent of the figure-making consciousness.

In general pattern, the figurative consciousness recalls the substitutions that occur in dreams and in hallucinations. Much that we read of dream-symbolism could be applied to poetic symbolism. Dream-symbolism, as investigations have shown, is a translation of content elaborated outside of con-

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<sup>1</sup> Stählin, W. "Zur Psychologie u. Statistik der Metaphern." Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1914, 31, 297-425.

sciousness,—perhaps in the deeps of the unconscious,—and emerging so transformed that the original is not always evident. The underlying motives are intimately related to deep-seated impulses of the given personality.

The substitution occurring in dreams is often cryptic in nature. The underlying meaning can at times be penetrated only after the most far-reaching analysis, an analysis of the intimate life of the dreamer. Literary or poetic symbolism must be more obvious in nature else the poet's songs would be sung for his ear alone. Yet, too, the allegories, the metaphors in which he delights must, for the most part, well spontaneously from his spirit and he must trust to their appealing to those among his readers whose life of instinct and emotion is similar to his own. This basal similarity in the instinctive and temperamental life constitutes native rapport.

Substitution of one mental object for another is then basal to the figurative consciousness. Before we proceed to discuss the details and varieties of this process, let us ask WHY the mind indulges in substitution.

Freud, as we have seen, finds the motivation of dream-distortion in an attempt at psychical disguise. The mind receives gratification of censured desires by masking them. Prince<sup>2</sup> insists that literary symbolism must, in general, be created by conscious selection of associations, since the writer can recall rejected material. No doubt, however, instances occur of literary constructions constituted quite in the dream-fashion, and quite likely expressive of the latent wish. Usually, the determining motive is the desire for novel expression, particularly of emotions and subtle conceptions.

In a technical study of the subject, we would need at this point to question in some detail the operations of associative activity. Two remarks only may be ventured. (1) In the work of mental construction the most delicate of relationships may serve the purposes of transition from one idea to another, and through divergent associations the most unexpected and original of constructions may arise, with condensation,—voluntary or involuntary,—carried out to the last degree. The greater the condensation the more intense and poetic the identification or metaphor which results. (2) In emotional excitement the associative range may be greatly extended, with chance for the most bizarre and subtle of combinations, regulated by emotional congruity alone.

As an example of substitution in general let me quote certain of my notes on dream-substitution.

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<sup>2</sup> "The Unconscious" (1914), p. 202 f. footnote.

"It is night on a B. and O. Pullman. The roadbed is very rough. I awake suddenly from a dream of a great black shaggy Newfoundland dog which is lying under my bed, shaking it with his restless heaving from side to side, and growling hoarsely meanwhile. Waking, I realize that the thrashing and growling of the dog fuse perfectly with the roll and rumble of the train. Moreover, on next seeing a locomotive, I notice what an excellent substitute for it the shaggy dog was."

A second example instances a more subtle substitution. "I am sleeping in a San Francisco hotel on a noisy street corner. Opposite the hotel is a garage and along the street, a car-line, with cars passing at intervals.

"I dream of a host of soldiers marching past the hotel; that is, in my dream I hear the trampling of many feet,—not, however, the even beat of trained regiments on the march. I wonder at the ragged uneven quality of the noise and in my dream I go to the window and look out. I see hosts of men and boys marching down the street, dressed in all manners, many of them in rags and tatters, others in uniform but carrying weapons of every description. 'Oh, they're raw recruits,' I say, in explanation of their uneven irregular tramping."

In this example the ragged line of men and boys, with the motley of garment and weapon, is an excellent substitute for the ragged irregular street noises, with which it appears to fuse perfectly.

The next example is a substitution in a waking state, the motivation of which is literary. "I am out in the dusk of a California night. Around me on bushes, and, above, drooping in great garlands from the roofs of the houses is a profusion of white roses. Suddenly, I am arrested by their luminosity. As the dark dims the outlines of all the world beside they grow an intenser white; they gleam phosphorescent in the dusk. They create a poetic mood, those white roses—I am restless with longing to express their loveliness. The saturation of sense and spirit would crytallize. How? In a figure? A poem? Suddenly the mood of the moment identifies itself with the mood that belongs to my feeling for ghosts, for wraiths, lovely and homeless wanderers. They are no longer roses—those gleaming white flowers—they are phantoms of desire, ghosts of all things lovely that were and are not, ghosts of unrealized dreams. And now the mood of the stars blends with the mood of roses; the dusk deepens; the roses float detached. They move starward."

Let us pause a moment to note some differences between this substitution and that of the dreams quoted. In the first dream, given auditory and motor sensations adopt for themselves an

explanation other than that of the real object. The whole movement of consciousness is definitely related to that involved in the constitution of an illusion. The actually felt roll and the actually heard growl are interpreted as due to a dog under my bed rather than to the movement and noise of the train,—a simple illusion. On waking, the fusion of Newfoundland-dog-consciousness and the boisterous-train-consciousness is found pleasing, satisfactory. In the second dream, ragged noises transform themselves into an image of soldiers in motley array. The substitution seems highly appropriate to the waking consciousness. The shift in the image has definitely enriched the meaning.

In the substitution of phantoms for roses we have a somewhat different condition. Here there is no fusion of sensations; the roses are not perceived as phantoms. There is no shift in imagery. The mood-background is the common element.

It happened, however, because of my interest in figures of speech, that I was not content with a fusion of moods. I wondered if possibly the white roses might actually shift into something else at the perceptual level. With this end in view I deliberately dwelt upon the mood-complex many times, visualizing the roses in the dusk. And once a spontaneous substitution occurred. Suddenly the night, dimly seen as a swarthy and voluptuous queen, was wreathed in the loveliest of milk pearls. Curiously enough, the substitution, while satisfactory as a substitution and quite in line with dream-substitutions, was not in harmony with the mood-tone of wraiths and dim desires. This substitution was sensuous, rich; not spiritual nor shot with faint starlight.

From these examples we see how complex a matter the substitution-consciousness may be. To bring out further details with reference to it, I may summarize certain experiments upon it. At times, I requested my subjects to read silently poetic fragments, chosen because of their figurative language, and to report their reactions; at other times, I read the fragments aloud to them and transcribed their oral reports.

Several reasons for variation in report are noticeable. In the first place explicit substitution of one mental content for another occurs much more frequently for some reagents than for others. And even when the substitution takes place variations are noticeable as to the degree with which the two contents fuse, or coalesce into one rich meaning. Substitution may be merely mechanical and result in incongruous, even brutal, juxtaposition of mental objects, or it may be a subtle

psychical reaction whereby new meanings are created, old meanings illuminated, shot through with the magic light of poesy. Obviously, readers of the literary temperament will stand out against those of a more matter-of-fact mental type. The reactions of both are of great interest.

In the second place, it is very difficult to watch the play of the mind in a subtle and evasive act. Investigators of the figurative consciousness realize the need of utilizing trained subjects who are used to catching psychical butterflies on the wing. Even so, the experimental attitude rubs the bloom off esthetic experiences. A purely analytical attitude may defeat the end one has in view. Moreover, the figure often gains its force from the context in which it is set. Fragmentary presentation is bad. Not only the reader and the method of eliciting the report introduce variation in response but also the nature of the figure chosen is influential. The psychical reaction to the simile is very different from that to a metaphor, or to a personification. The hyperbole reaction has a psychic coloration all its own.

In a moment we will consider certain specific reactions to certain specific figures. But before doing this let us list the questions we have in mind in carrying out the experiment and the answers given by previous investigators.

(1) In what psychical terms are the two portions of the comparison apprehended? Have we, for example, an imaginal representation for both the main and the accessory portion of the metaphor or for one part only? If the latter be true, which part of the comparison gives the image? Will the reactions of a number of subjects be consistent in respect to this point?

(2) If both parts of the comparison be represented, what relation holds between the parts? Is there merely a displacement of one content by another? A displacement so final that there is an actual conflict, or change in meaning? Does the image of the literal portion of the simile melt into that of the figurative so that a complete fusion, a coalescence results?

(3) In what relation does the double mental content stand to the complex out of which the two thoughts come? What constitutes the background that lies above and around and below the specific meaning? Or may a common background fail the two meanings?

(4) Does the point of comparison come to consciousness? On general grounds it has been conjectured that too minute, too precise imaginal accompaniment to figurative expression would often be embarrassing. Sensuous translation of a figure may emphasize the difference between the objects compared

and thus destroy the unity of comprehension necessary for artistic appreciation of the figure. This conjecture is supported by reports on the imaginal reaction to poetry from which it appears that readers with a habit of concrete visualization find many similes and metaphors distinctly grotesque. Even such a simple departure from the literal as in Galsworthy's line, "Wind, wind, heather Gypsy Whistling in my tree" is found unpleasant by the visual reader who resorts to concrete picturing of a gypsy. But the word "gypsy" as a carrier of a delicate emotional and attitudinal reaction results in delightful appreciation of the poet's meaning.

An attempt to determine in some detail individual differences in the reaction to the simile has been reported by Karl Groos.<sup>3</sup> Groos cites Plüss's<sup>4</sup> criticism of the imaginal theory of the simile and Plüss's conclusion that the value and purpose of a poetic comparison are not to be found in the arousal of a visual image but in the creation of a "Gesamtvorstellung" common to both the principal and subordinate object.

Groos, in turn, calls attention to individual differences in reaction and the probability that imaginal comprehension may be potent, at least for certain readers. But the imaginal form need not be visual in every case; tactual, auditory, kinesthetic material must also be recognized. "The conscious attitude which is the common carrier or background for both the main and the metaphorical presentation may, however, be intellectually colored for some readers; emotionally colored for others."<sup>5</sup> The conceptual and thought side of the metaphorical consciousness must be emphasized as well as the sensuous aspect.

Specifically, from the reports of his subjects, Groos<sup>6</sup> found five different possibilities that might arise in the imaginal comprehension of a poetic comparison: (1) the imaginal experience chiefly concerned with the main object; (2) the imaginal content largely concerned with the figurative portion of the comparison; (3) an image for the principal object only; (4) an image for only the accessory object; (5) equally intense imaginal representation for both parts of the comparison. Most interestingly, however, Groos' tabulation shows an amazing preponderance of imagery for the accessory or figurative part. Of his 82 cases of imaginal representation one only is that of imagery of the main object alone; in the other 81

<sup>3</sup> "Das anschauliche Vorstellen beim poetische Gleichnis." *Zsch. f. Aesthetik*, 1914, 9, 186-204.

<sup>4</sup> "Das Gleichnis in Erzählen der Dichtung." *Verein deutscher Philologen u. Schulmänner im Basel*. 1907.

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 187.

<sup>6</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 198 f.

reports there is evidence of representation of the accessory object in some form or other.

Cases are cited where in the imaginal representation of the figurative portion substitutions occur or details are added in such a way as to disturb the value of the figure or to cause a concentration on the figure for its own sake. Possibly the background of the accessory image may differ in mood-tone from that required by the main element. The mind may, however, indulge in detours and irrelevancies without loss of esthetic enjoyment. Groos found that most of the reports of visual imagery were of clear and individual images.

The presence of imaginal representation for both parts of the figure was found in certain reports to diminish the esthetic unity; the oscillation of the images destroyed the feeling. In other cases this double representation was pleasing. It is impossible to determine from the material at hand under what conditions this latter effect resulted. Possibly, faint imagery was conducive to pleasantness; the visual images because of their weak determination might flow together into a 'Gesamteindruck,' "a shadowy something floated up." A mingling, a melting together of two vague images into one, enhances the esthetic pleasure.

Let us take an analogy from the photoplay. The pictures of certain reagents replace one another as crudely as did those of the kinematoscope of earlier years. One can almost hear the whir of the machinery. For others, the successive pictures dissolve, melt into one another, with the exquisite modulations of the artistic photoplay of today.

It is to various degrees of the blending of object and image that Sterzinger has recourse in explanation of the esthetic value of different metaphorical presentations. His investigation of the various factors contributing to the substitution-consciousness is probably the most thoroughgoing treatment at hand.<sup>7</sup> He instances various forms that substitution may take, namely, oscillation, simultaneity, and melting together of two images. The process is complete when a new construction comes into existence. The object is no longer seen as such but as a second; there is a union of psychic elements giving a product with new qualities.

Substitution, or a displacement of one image by another may, of course, take place in regions other than the visual. As a peculiar instance of such substitution Sterzinger classes metaphors in which images from different sense-provinces fuse (melt) together. The basal presentation, for example,

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<sup>7</sup> "Die Gründe des Gefallens u. Missgefallens am poetischen Bilder." Arch. f. ges. Psychol., 1913, 29, 16-91.



and the image of comparison may belong to different departments of sense. Such metaphors, which are synesthetic in coloring, we have already discussed in another connection. They furnish, however, a most valuable material for exploitation of the figurative consciousness, and are increasingly frequent in the new literature.

Let us turn now to our own experimental results. In many respects the reports are much like those collected by Groos. There is, however, no case of excessive preponderance of imagery for the metaphorical part of the figure, a result which doubtless was largely determined by the nature of the two similes utilized in Groos' experiment.

Let us take first the Homeric simile of Arnold's to which we referred above.

"For very young he seem'd, tenderly rear'd;  
Like some young cypress, tall, and dark, and straight,  
Which in a queen's secluded garden throws  
Its slight dark shadow on the moonlit turf  
By midnight, to a bubbling fountain's sound—  
So slender Sohrab seem'd, so softly rear'd."

Here the comparison is made with utmost explicitness. On the one hand there is the prince; on the other, the cypress to which the prince is likened. What do our reagents do with the figure? This simile is one that lends itself so readily to imaginal representation that rich imagery—visual and auditory—is reported. The majority of the reagents visualize both the prince and the cypress but in varied relation. Both may appear in the garden side by side; there may occur an oscillation, the prince vanishes as the cypress appears; a few report a blending of images. The image of the prince melts into that of the dark cypress. For almost all reagents the garden background is present in full richness; there is the sound of fountain and the midnight mood.

Or take this charming bit from Shelley:

"The plumed insects swift and free,  
Like golden boats on a sunny sea"—

One conjectures that for the poet writing the lines the insects (not too precisely determined entomologically!) are winging their gladsome flight through the summer air. Suddenly, there is an intensification of the golden sunshine and of the blithesome rocking of the insects and lo! they are insects no longer but golden boats on a sunny sea.

What now does the appreciative reader do with this simile? Let us first emulate the statisticians and cite a few figures. Of twenty-six readers, sixteen image both parts of the simile;

five image the first part only, and three image the second part alone; one reagent is so obsessed by the music of the words that he is occupied by this melody to the exclusion of all else.

Certain comments are instructive. A few readers are intellectually disturbed by the word "pluméd," the appropriateness of which they question. Eight readers report a break in connection between the two parts of the figures; the boat-image, although pleasant, is irrelevant.

Others give a complete replacement of one mental object by another. The insects vanish and golden boats appear on a realistic lake. Perhaps no point to the comparison is realized. The only persistent content is the thought or feeling or sensuous image of a summer day. But there are reagents for whom the point of comparison mirrors itself in consciousness very definitely in the intensification of the golden color in insect or boat or air, or in the deepened sensation of the swinging movement. For such reagents the consciousness of insect and boat may fuse perfectly.

One of the interesting mechanisms of dream-fabrication is that of compression, a packing of an image with meaning; its so-called overdetermination. In poetry such packing of the image is evident to the highest degree; there is multiplicity of meaning, as in Thompson's opening verses of "The Poppy."

"SUMMER set lip to earth's bosom bare,  
And left the flush'd print in a poppy there;  
Like a yawn of fire from the grass it came,  
And the fanning wind puff'd it to flapping flame.

With burnt mouth red like a lion's it drank  
The blood of the sun as he slaughter'd sank,  
And dipp'd its cup in the purpurate shine  
When the eastern conduits ran with wine."

Only an intense imaginative response to these lines brings appreciation. A reader scanning them with an intellectualistic set of mind is baffled, confused, irritated.

Our third report upon experimental reactions to a figure of speech concerns a metaphor in which compression, condensation, is carried much further than in the Arnold or Shelley simile cited previously. The two lines to be quoted constitute the whole of the poem, one by Ezra Pound, a poem which illustrates Pound's own definition of the image "that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time."<sup>8</sup> The poem—"In a Station of the Metro," follows:

The apparition of these faces in the crowd;  
Petals on a wet black bough—

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<sup>8</sup> "Poetry," II, p. 12.

It is not surprising that this closely packed figure fails to appeal to some readers; nor that others realize its charm only on rereading it. But when the suggested fusion occurs the reader is submerged in that feeling of poetic beauty which is one of the mysteries of experience. How those innumerable pale faces in the dusk of a dim station suddenly whiten, blossom against a blackness that shivers with spiritual desolation.

Let us consider another poem of today, "Lost," taken from Sandburg's *Chicago suite*,<sup>9</sup> a poem chosen because the comparison is deeply embedded in the main image and because the emotional coloration throughout is in such harmony with the sensuous intention of the first two lines.

Desolate and lone  
All night long on the lake  
Where fog trails and mist creeps,  
The whistle of a boat  
Calls and cries unendingly,  
Like some lost child  
In tears and trouble  
Hunting the harbor's breast  
And the harbor's eyes.

Comparatively few subjects image the child visually, a reaction that is, indeed, felt to be somewhat grotesque. Perfect fusion on an auditory basis may, however, occur; the whistle of the boat melts into the wail of the child. The most commonly reported reaction centers about organic and emotional experiences with perhaps vague visual glimpses of the dim lake and the lost ship. The "lost child" feeling coalesces so perfectly with the emotion aroused by the lines preceding that the lines are felt to be exceedingly effective.

These examples,—chosen from many—must serve to illustrate the figurative reaction. It is obvious that we have but touched upon the general problem. Not only variations in reaction as we pass from reader to reader deserve consideration but also variations in presenting the figure, whether it precede or follow the main portion of the comparison, and the degree to which it is telescoped.

The various forms of synecdoche and metonymy no doubt deserve technical study but such study cannot now be entered upon.

We cannot, however, refrain from saying a word or two concerning the hyperbole consciousness which has a coloration peculiarly its own. Perhaps of all figures it sails closest to the winds of the ridiculous; perhaps it suffers most from being torn from its connections, and from fragmentary presentation,

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<sup>9</sup> "Poetry," III, p. 195.

for it needs as its background the mood of the whole production in which it is embedded.

We must content ourselves with one example of hyperbole, Sandburg's provocative allegory:<sup>10</sup>

My head knocks against the stars.  
My feet are on the hilltops.  
My finger-tips are in the valleys and shores of universal life.  
Down in the sounding foam of primal things I reach my hands and  
play with pebbles of destiny.

I have been to hell and back many times.  
I know all about heaven, for I have talked with God.  
I dabble in the blood and guts of the terrible.  
I know the passionate seizure of beauty  
And the marvelous rebellion of man at all signs reading "Keep Off."

My name is Truth and I am the most elusive captive in the universe.

Here the imaginal representation may be grotesque. Self-projection in kinesthetic terms may, however, induce the feeling of bigness to an extraordinary extent and from such explicit self-projection it is but a step to an attitudinal consciousness, pregnant with meaning.

We have seen that the background out of which come the main and the accessory part of a comparison deserves especial attention. This background is in part conditioned by the whole production in which the figure occurs; in part, it is determined by the specific attitude or purpose of the reader at the moment of reading.

One may, perhaps, discriminate three possible phases to a background, one of which probably predominates in a given case. The background may be sensuous (imaginal) or emotional or intellectualistic. Two visualizations may have a common setting; both Sohrab and the cypress are seen in the midnight garden. The background may be emotional; the lost boat and the lost child belong together in one's universe of sad things. The background may be intellectualistic; the point of comparison may come to clear consciousness as in an analogy. As A to B so is C to D. The similar relationships between the two parts of the analogy may be focused.<sup>11</sup> Such an intellectualistic background may include critical discrimination with a sense of the inadequacy of the figure. Such a background is often evoked by the experimental attitude. My reagents remark on occasion: "The Comparison is far-fetched; Insects aren't boats," etc.

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<sup>10</sup> "Poetry," III (1914).

<sup>11</sup> Read, Carveth, "The Function of Relations in Thought." *Brit. J. of Psychol.*, 1911, 4.

In any case, the explicitness with which the point of comparison comes to consciousness is a matter of considerable importance. In the imaginative reaction I am inclined to believe it rarely enters as a distinct sense of relationship. If one review the situation retrospectively one can determine the point of comparison and pass upon its value but in a literary reaction it remains in the fringe or contributes an emotional tone of appropriateness, of fitness, without being focused.

When brought into clear consciousness the point of comparison is often found to be double or triple. Thus the metaphor involved in the poem, "A Station in the Metro," is found to be highly compressed. Readers agree on two points of comparison; the multiplicity of faces and of petals, and the contrast of the wan faces and white flowers with the shadowy background.

Frequently, however, the failure to get a poetic background is shown by the irrelevance of the point of comparison that comes to consciousness. In nothing more than in this is the difference between the poetic and the prosaic attitude manifest. For the former, there is a tingling subconsciousness of meaning, images, emotions; a rich complexity of feelings centered in the figure that synthesizes the whole, that crystallizes the saturated solution. The prosaic reader pounces on the comparison as a thing in itself sans background. He may puzzle over a purely irrelevant relationship or analyze with amused discrimination the curious juxtaposition of things so unlike as the sound of a voice and mission furniture but he fails to make the synthesis that was the figure's reason for being.

Always, of course, a simile or metaphor must be estimated psychologically, not logically. Its value lies just in the union of things apparently quite heterogeneous. Unity arises out of the consciousness of difference, hence the creation of new mental content. It is a turning from the straight and narrow path of logical rectitude; it is meant to be. Its peculiar tang is the outcome of its arousal of a double meaning, with the quivering tension of an unsolved problem.

From the psychological point of view, metaphors might be classified relatively to certain characters of the point of comparison. If the main object vanish from consciousness with the presentation of the secondary object of thought, this latter image may then be very freely decorated with no regard for the point of departure. This gives us the discursive or holiday comparison which Eastman describes so aptly.<sup>12</sup> Or the main object of thought may persist with the presentation of the

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<sup>12</sup> "The Enjoyment of Poetry," p. 83.

accessory image; a return to the original object may call forth new images with a heaping up of comparisons. The point of comparison may shift as the figure develops. The explicitness with which the point of union comes to consciousness determines whether the point of comparison will be emphasized or the simile freely elaborated and decorated.

A number of topics suggest themselves as worthy of further study. The development of the figure-making consciousness in the race is an important chapter in the history of mental development.<sup>13</sup> A discussion of this topic would take us too far afield. Naming an object is in itself a comparison, a latent identification. Prose is, in very truth, "fossil poetry." This much comment only may be made. In the primitive metaphor, fusion is intensive; the early comparisons are expressive, not literary, devices. Probably no break between the objects compared is seen; there is no conscious distinction between figurative and literal manner of speech; the comparison or simile is felt to constitute an explanation by means of which the primitive man orientates himself in the objective world. In such instances the metaphor is practically motivated, just as in more developed minds it may be employed to clarify an idea or strengthen a sensuous impression. Still more closely akin, however, to the primitive and child-figurative consciousness is that found in cases in which the emotion gives birth to the metaphor, when the white fire of passion fuses objects otherwise divorced. This fusion is very intensive in the primitive and child mind, and in the poetic frenzy. Hence the metaphor which identifies is much more poetic, because much more highly fused, than is the simile which merely asserts a similarity. Thus we end where we began with the conception of the substitution—consciousness as basal.

Sterzinger's investigation<sup>14</sup> showed that substitution (*Unterschiebung*) is a dominating factor in esthetic pleasure. It is a principal moment in all art as well as in poetic metaphors. In Japanese art, for instance, "*Unterschiebung*" with reference to color is a common device. No doubt study of certain modern artists of Europe and America would show curious displacements of elements operating both in imaginal and perceptual constructions. New esthetic moods or feeling-tones may arise in consequence of substitution. The feeling of dreamlikeness, so frequently aroused by art-products, is called forth through the union of two images, neither of which would in itself give this feeling.

<sup>13</sup> Moog, W., "Die Homerischen Gleichnisse," *Zsch. f. Aesth.* 7 (1912), 104-128; 266-302; 353-371.

<sup>14</sup> Loc. cit.